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Abstract 
Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) show the several conceptual limits that new 
materialism and postmodern subject models have for psychological theory and 
research. The present study continues in this discussion and argues that the 
applicability of the ideas of quantum-inspired new materialism depends on the 
theoretical perspectives that we consider for analysis: be it the first-person perspective 
referring to the subjective experience of a human subject, or the third-person 
perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer. While the 
arguments of new materialism are in accordance with the analysis of the act of 
observation performed by an external observer, some problems arise when trying to 
theoretically approach the first-person subjective experience of a human subject. For 
example, new materialism fails to explain why human minds can maintain the 
awareness of a subject’s identity throughout their lives and to recall the memories 
about their past personal experiences. 
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In line with Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020), this reflection aims to discuss 
some issues of postmodern subject models in terms of the theoretical analysis of the 
human psyche and consciousness. In a nutshell, postmodern subject models, 
particularly Barad’s (2007) agential realism, propose that human subjects are 
suggested to be continually produced in the process of an intra-active becoming, all 
the time and everywhere. Within this perspective, human subjects are phenomena, 
and phenomena are suggested to exist without any prior existence of independent 
entities or relata. Entities are assumed to not pre-exist their intra-action, and before the 
so-called "agential cuts", entities are always indeterminate. Only by the force of intra-
activity do the boundaries of subjects, meanings, and patterns become determinate in 
the ongoing flow of agential cuts, but only temporarily. The phenomena are ceaselessly 
being re-enfolded, reformed, and re-configurated. Moments of observation (or 
measurement) are examples of the "agential cuts". During agential cuts, the entities, 
e.g. human subjects, are assumed to emerge and are available to the senses or 
apparatuses of external observers. Any entity is produced through the complex 
agential intra-actions of multiple material-discursive practices or apparatuses. Prior to 
this intra-action, there is no such thing as an entity or human subject with 
distinguishable boundaries and identity. Simply put, entities become determinate 
repeatedly during the ongoing flow of agency. Barad (2007) speaks of an "ongoing 
reconfigurating of boundaries". The postmodern understanding of human subjects 
implies that human subjects are suggested to be constantly produced again and again 
in the flow of time. This approach does not consider the possibility of the continuous 
existence of entities and human subjects. 
Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) point out that this approach makes the 
investigation of the universal characteristics of human experiential life and any 
generalization of psychological findings impossible. This criticism argues against the 
assumption of postmodern subject models, where human bodies and human subjects 
are not objects with inherent boundaries and properties that pre-exist as such. The 
postmodern, new materialist’s approach claims that knowledge, intentions, and 
subjectivity is not something that belongs to the human subject but is always a result 
of specific intra-actions. In contrast to this assumption, Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe 
(2020) insist on the givenness of the human body which has universal characteristics. 
They also formulate the paradox of "multiple subjects relating to the same body". The 
postmodern, new materialist’s assumption of the constant change and production of 
the subject enables the theoretical possibility of the emergence of multiple subjects 
relating to the same body (or even multiple bodies) in time flow. Simply put, if the 
boundaries and subjectivity of a human subject are not inherent and pre-exist each 
agential cut, then the identity of the human subject is not permanent and may vary 
across different moments in time.  
This criticism is legitimate; however, every coin has two sides. The present 
reflection shows that the applicability of the quantum-inspired, new materialist subject 
models relies on a type of perspective that we shall further consider. Furthermore, we 
introduce new arguments showing that postmodern subject models also face other 
limitations, namely the impossibility of explaining human conscious self-awareness 
and storage and the later recollection of past personal experiences. 
To begin with, two different perspectives of the theoretical analysis of a human 
subject have to be distinguished: a first-person perspective referring to a subjective 
experience involving a subject’s own observation of its own internal milieu, and a third-
person perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer, 
e.g. a researcher (Pokropski, 2019; Trnka & Smelik, 2020). First-person and third-
person perspectives represent two different analytical positions. When considering 
human experience, the first-person perspective reflects the position of an "internal 
observer" and the process when a subject observes its own experiences, e.g. 
emotions, reasoning, proprioceptive sensing, or any other mental contents. In contrast, 
the third-person perspective reflects the position of an "external observer" and the 
process when one subject asks another subject about their actual or past internal 
experiences. If the external observer shifts his or her attention from another subject to 
their own experiences, the perspective changes and the third-person observation is 
changed to first-person observation. 
The new materialist approach can be defended if we consider the position of an 
external observer that is observing a human subject. The idea of "agential cut" was 
inspired by the effect known in quantum mechanics as the "observer effect". Simply 
put, observer effect means that the act of observing will influence the appearance of a 
phenomenon (Trnka & Lorencova, 2016). Let us take a closer look at this effect. There 
are three agencies that influence the emergence of the phenomena: the observer, the 
observed, and the apparatus used for the observation, e.g. technological devices 
commonly used in experimental and physiological psychology. The observed, the 
observer, and the apparatus interact together, and this interaction is understood as 
three intra-acting agencies that are present during the "agential cut", which play a 
constructive role in the appearance of phenomena (Barad, 2007; Huniche & Sørensen, 
2019). Various instances of observer effect are well-described also in psychology, 
where they are known as audience effect (Bateson et al., 2006; Cañigueral & Hamilton, 
2019), actor-observer bias (Jones & Nisbett, 1972), the Hawthorne effect (Chiesa & 
Hobbs, 2008), fundamental attribution error, or attribution bias (Ross, 2018; see also 
Burghardt et al., 2012). 
When turning our attention to the first-person subjective experience of a human 
subject, the new materialist and postmodern understanding of human subjects faces 
several difficulties. As mentioned above, these approaches make the investigation of 
the universal characteristics of experiential life and the generalization of psychological 
findings impossible, because the subjectivity is not believed to be permanently tied to 
the human subject, and the boundaries of a human subject are suggested not to be 
determinate across time. However, these are not the only problems that the 
postmodern understanding of human subjects faces. There are at least two other, also 
fundamental problems: the problem of how to explain the continuous first-person 
access to a subject’s experience of stream of consciousness and the process of 
recalling a subject’s memories of the past.  
Phenomenology, as well as empirical psychological research, has shown that 
people have first-person access to a continuous stream of their subjective experiences 
(Manning & Manning, 2007; Trnka & Smelik, 2020; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Empirical 
research has also shown that people remember their past life experiences and are 
able to recall at least some of these experiences from memory (Díaz, 2018; Rugg & 
Vilberg, 2013). The concept of self-awareness denotes that the internal milieu of 
human subjects can become the object of a subject’s own attention (Llinás, 2008; 
Morin, 2006). In other words, subjects can attend to their mental states, mental 
processes, and mental contents, also including an awareness of their identity, and can 
recall past actions, behaviors, and experiences. 
Strikingly, these psychological findings prove to be difficult when interpreted 
from the position of new materialism and Barad’s (2007) agential realism. If human 
subjects would be "made" again and again in the process of a constant, intra-active 
becoming without any pre-existing relata (Barad, 2007), one can seriously pose the 
question of how is it possible that human subjects have an awareness of their identity 
and their past experiences? If human subjects would not preexist their intra-action, 
how is possible that they have first-person access to their past actions, behaviors, and 
experiences? If human subjects would not have a distinguishable identity prior to a 
particular intra-action or agential cut, why are human subjects able to remember their 
identity and know "who they are" across different moments of time? Are self-awareness 
and memory retrieval only illusions or random artefacts of brain functioning? The 
current evidence of psychological research does not indicate so. Instead of assuming 
that human subjects constantly emerge during discrete moments of the flow of agential 
cuts, it seems that there is some continuity, at least in the subjective conscious 
experience of a subject’s existence. The human ability to store past experiences in 
memory and to recall them later enables the maintenance of identity in a human 
subject. This ability enables the continuous experience of a subject’s identity and the 
remembrance of a subject’s  personal characteristics in the time flow. It is necessary 
to say that not all past experiences of a subject are always stored in the subject’s 
memory as fixed and invariable patterns. On the contrary, they are constantly modified 
by the cognitive processing of past experiences in the time flow, and some of them can 
be also lost in the process of forgetting (Conway & Holmes, 2004). But they exist, at 
least subjectively and temporarily, and can be accessed through first-person 
introspection or even be communicated/shared with other human subjects in social 
interaction (Trnka & Smelik, 2020; Morin, 2006). 
Barad’s (2007) agential realism and understanding of a constant, intra-active 
becoming was inspired by the theory of quantum mechanics. The idea of the quantum 
sea (Puthoff, 2002) assumes that a vacuum is never particle-free but consists of 
continuous processes of virtual particle-pair creation and annihilation. In the vacuum, 
these processes share some similarities with the idea of the constant, intra-active 
becoming proposed by the new materialist understanding of the human subject. Also, 
so-called zero-point fluctuations in the vacuum are random, fluctuating energies that 
are in a constant process of becoming. These fleeting electromagnetic waves and pairs 
of microparticles are assumed to perpetually come into being, only to return into 
nonexistence. 
The effort to apply quantum principles to the theoretical understanding of the 
human subject as well as to the interpretation of human behavior and mental processes 
is certainly legitimate. Human bodies and brains are made of matter and energy (Trnka 
& Lorencova, 2016). Matter and energy are basal substances from which all human 
subjects are built up. Quantum mechanics thus has great potential for informing and 
inspiring theoretical psychology and human subject models. However, the key question 
is how can the principles found in the research of microparticles be applied in 
theoretical psychology? Obviously, the answer is not straightforward. Quantum 
mechanics investigates objects that are certainly less complex systems than human 
beings are. Humans are much more complex systems than quantum microparticles, 
and as such, they also show some emergent properties, for example, memory and the 
conscious experience of the continuous persistence of their body and identity across 
time. Aside from some specific instances like amnesia, depersonalization disorder, or 
altered states of consciousness (Sierra & David, 2011; Trnka, 2019), people are 
consciously aware of their identities, and this self-awareness is present even in 
moments when they are not observed by any external observer. 
Past psychological research has revealed evidence for the continuous 
persistence of the relationship between a subject’s body and a subject’s conscious 
experience. The conscious experience of owning one’s body (Martin, 1995) is an 
example of a first-person experience, when a subject is aware of their body over time. 
This coherent sense of body ownership (sense of embodiment) arises from the 
integration of interoceptive signals and external sensory inputs (Moseley et al., 2012; 
Tsakiris, 2010, 2017). This experience of embodiment is continuous and occurs 
automatically, without demand on cognitive effort (Fahey et. al, 2018). 
Moreover, human subjects are also able to maintain a subjective sense of being 
the same individual and the same consciousness throughout their lives (Díaz, 2018). 
Thanks to the episodic memory system, the recording, acquisition, codification, and 
recollection of past personal experiences and their location in time is possible (Rugg & 
Vilberg, 2013). Such memory repositories enable the creation of an autobiography and 
a narrative of a subject’s own past. 
The maintenance of a subjective sense of being by the same individual and 
subjective sense of body ownership throughout the lives of human subjects contrasts 
with the assumption of a chain of discontinuous moments of agential cuts, as supposed 
by new materialist subject models. As mentioned above, new materialism and 
postmodern subject models suppose that the human subject is produced during 
agential cuts without a prior existence of their distinguishable bodies and identities. 
The recent findings of psychological research do not indicate this. In contrast, 
psychological research shows that human subjects can keep a subjective sense of 
being the same individual and a subjective sense of body ownership throughout their 
lives. Under normal states of consciousness, the first-person access to a subject’s 
autobiography, i.e. the narrative of a subject’s own past, and body ownership does not 
seem to be dependent on agential intra-actions. 
The aforementioned insights aim to stimulate future theory development in this 
field and to also formulate further fundamental questions regarding the nature of 
human subjects, the psyche, and the conscious experience of the world. Among other 
issues, future theoretical discussions should explore the embodied nature of self-
awareness and the human ability to perceive and represent ourselves even at the pre-
reflective level (Bielas & Michalczyk, 2019; Ciaunica & Crucianelli, 2019; Nida-
Rümelin, 2017; Picolas & Soueltzis, 2019). By positing the question of the unity of 
consciousness (Levin et al., 2019), how (and if) human subjects are able to integrate 
different components from the experience of streams of consciousness into one, 
integrative, superordinate internal stream of semiotic content should be explored (see 
e.g. Rafieian, 2012). Within the self-memory system model (Conway & Holmes, 2004), 
it is also relevant to consider how the recollection and construction of past, self-related 
memories are shaped by personal goal-relevance. Future theoretical discussions 
should also explore if the conscious access to a subject’s experience involves the 
selective routing of representational content to neural systems, and how such selective 
mechanisms could work (Smith, 2016). 
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